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“Neuroethics” is a young field wherein
ancient questions about minds, persons, and
society meet newfangled knowledge about
brains, machines, and behavior. Most work
in neuroethics falls into one of two discrete
arms: the neurobiology of morality and the
ethics of neuroscience and related technolo-
gies. The former involves the philosophy of
the mind and experiments in neuropsychol-
ogy. The latter arm, led by applied ethicists
and scientists, considers the scientific basis
and societal implications of neuroscience re-
search  and  technologies,  including  psy-
chopharmacology, neuroimaging, forensic
neuroscience,  and  computer-brain  inter-
faces.
The  essays  in  Scientific  and  Philo-
sophical Perspectives in Neuroethics gen-
erally fall into one of these two camps and
often represent top-shelf contributions to
the field. One of the strengths of this vol-
ume is its strong, concise introduction to
the philosophy of mind. The essays “On the
Cusp” by Ralph Ellis and “The Mind-Body
Issue” by Paolo Costa are solid summaries
for the non-philosopher, while the more
technical “Toward a Cognitive Neurobiol-
ogy of the Moral Virtues” by Paul Church-
land  is  an  impressive  glimpse  into
contemporary theory of mind. “Can We
Read Minds?” is a strong overview of per-
haps the most hotly covered issue in neu-
roethics: the use of neuroimaging in lie
detection and other ways of recording and
interpreting thought. 
Yet for all its strengths, Scientific and
Philosophical Perspectives in Neuroethics
recapitulates  a  weakness  in  the  field  at
large: the lack of robust clinical work. One
possible exception to this trend is the essay
on  pain  medicine  by  James  Giordano,
which is republished from an early volume
of  the  journal  Neuroethics.  Using  ideas
from the philosophy of mind and applied
ethics, Giordano demonstrates how the rad-
ically subjective nature of pain informs our
duties, while deconstructing the imposing,
technologically driven political economy of
clinical pain medicine. This work manages
to be one of the volume’s most grounded
and yet most theoretical essays and one that
would please admirers of Heidegger, Fou-
cault, and Haraway. This is a particularly
impressive feat, knowing how insufficient
the discipline of bioethics has been on the
topic of pain.
Aside from Giordano’s work, the vol-
ume tends to gloss over true clinical ex-
amples rather than incorporate them into
robust theory. In psychiatry, for example,
there are references to the use of cortisol
testing and neuroimaging in the assess-
ment  of  depression  and  its  response  to
therapy; such techniques have little or no
place  in  practice  despite  the  allure  of
progress they embody. There are frequent
mentions of the dangers of overprescribing
drugs for childhood psychiatric disorders
such as attention deficit hyperactivity dis-
order and bipolar disease, but no discus-
sion of the risks and benefits of using such
drugs or non-pharmacological treatments
in developing brains and persons. Better
integration of truly practical work — such
as Paul Ford’s rigorous studies of clinical
neuroethics consultation at the Cleveland
Clinic, which is not included in this vol-
ume — would help ensure that the disci-
pline  continues  to  focus  on  crucial
questions looming before human society
rather than being tempted into a fantasy of
scientific progress.
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